This paper proposes a model for commonsense causal reasoning, based on the basic idea of neural networks. After an analysis of the advantages and limitations of existing accounts of causality, a fuzzy logic based formalism FEL is proposed that takes into account the inexactness and the cumulative evidentiality of commonsense causal reasoning, overcoming the limitations of existing accounts. Analyses concerning how FEL handles various aspects of commonsense causal reasoning are performed, in an abstract way. FEL can be implemented (naturally) in a neural (connectionist) network. This work also serves to link rule-based reasoning with neural network models, in that a rule-encoding scheme (FEL) is equated directly to a neural network model. 1 1 I wish to thank Dave Waltz, James Pustejovsky, and Tim Hickey for discussions, comments, and suggestions, during the early stage of this and related work. Thanks also go to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.
Introduction
The issue of causality has recently received a lot of attentions from various perspectives (Shoham 11] , Iwasaki & Simon 5] , de Kleer & Brown 3], Pearl 7] , etc.). The issue has fundamental importance, as causality is considered \the cement of the universe" (Hume 23] ), and the issue also has wide ranging impact on areas such as learning, control, and recognition. However, most of the existing logic-based models are aimed for modeling truth functional aspects of causal knowledge, and they tend to ignore some important characteristics of commonsense causal reasoning, for example, the gradedness of concepts, inexact causal connections, the evidentiality of causal rules, etc., while probabilistically motivated models are mainly concerned with the probabilistic aspect of causal events, and they are computationally complex and oftentimes have only marginal cognitive plausibility in terms of computational mechanisms involved. Connectionism provides a new and di erent kind of models that might be of help in accounting for causality in commonsense reasoning. These models entertain a number of interesting properties that other models lack, ignore, or discount (for example, massive parallelism, generalization, fault/noise tolerance, and adaptability; see Rumelhart et al 8] , Waltz & Feldman 20], Sun & Waltz 14] ) and present a new perspective of reasoning as a complex, dynamic, and continuous process. It will be worthwhile to look into the question of how such models can deal with the issue of causality. This paper will examine the issue of causality in commonsense reasoning and will propose a model for commonsense causal reasoning, which utilizes ideas from neural network models. Seeing the advantages and limitations of existing accounts of causality, including Shoham's logic, I will develop a new formalism, which takes into account the inexactness and the cumulative evidentiality of commonsense causal reasoning. While the perspective and some ideas of neural networks are adopted in this development, details of implementations of neural network models and their applications are not my concerns. However, analyses will be performed, in an abstract way, regarding how the model handles various aspects of commonsense causal reasoning. In so doing, a ruleencoding scheme is equated directly to a neural network model; in this way, rule-based reasoning is linked to neural network models.
Shoham's Causal Theory
In discussing causality, as commonly assumed in the literature, we have the following picture in mind: causal connections exist between events, which are the basic entities of the world, and some of these events are causes and some are e ects; however, causes alone may not guarantee a particular e ect; we also need enabling conditions, which also have to be taken into account; a theory of causal connections between events consists of a set of causal statements that describe the relations between causes and e ects. The question is how causal statements are structured.
Let us look into Shoham's account of causality (Shoham 11] and 12]), which is undoubtedly one of the most notable contemporary accounts of causality with rule-based formalisms. His temporal modal logic formalism has a close resemblance to Horn clause logic, and therefore is very suitable for use in rule-based reasoning systems. According to Shoham's Causal Theory (CT), causes are primary conditions which, together with other conditions, will bring about the e ect. These \other" conditions are somewhat secondary. In reasoning, as long as we know that the primary conditions (causes or necessary conditions) are true and that there is no information that the secondary conditions (enabling conditions or possible conditions) are false, then we can deduce that e ects will follow. The theory is described in terms of modal logic, with one basic modal operator (2 or necessity) for specifying necessary conditions. and one auxiliary modal operator (3 or possibility) for specifying possible conditions (Hughes and Creswell 2] ). The formal de nition is as follows:
De nition 1 A Causal Theory is a set of formulas of the following form i 2n i a i (t i1 ; t i2 )^j 3n j b j (t j1 ; t j2 ) ?! 2c(t 1 ; t 2 ) where n i 's are either : or nothing, (t i ; t j ) denotes a time interval, t 2 > t i2 for all i's, t 2 > t j2 for all j's, n i a i 's are necessary conditions (causes), and n j b i 's are possible conditions (enabling conditions). C is concluded i all n i a i 's are known to be true and all n j b j 's are not known to be false. 2 From the standpoint of modeling commonsense knowledge, this model has some advantages, such as that it provides a simple and elegant formalism with e cient inference algorithms (see 11] ), that it is easily representable (and implementable), and that it has compatibility with philosophical accounts of causality (see 11]). On the other hand, the model ignores many aspects of commonsense causal reasoning; for example, 1. All propositions in this theory are binary: either true or false. There is no sense of gradedness.
On the other hand, commonsense knowledge is certainly not limited to true/false only (Sun 15] , Hink & Woods 4] ). For example, \dry", \tall", and \humid" are all fuzzy concepts | there is no well-de ned cut-o point for any of them.
2. Beside the inexactness of individual concepts, reasoning processes in reality can also be inexact and evidential. Speci cally, the evidential combination process is often cumulative (as observed in many reasoning data; see Sun 15] , 16]); that is, it tends to \add up" various pieces of evidence to reach a conclusion, with a con dence that is determined from the \sum" of the con dences of the di erent pieces of evidence. Moreover, di erent pieces of evidence are often weighted; that is, each of them may have more or less impact, depending on its importance or salience, in the reasoning process and the conclusion reached. We have to nd a way of combining evidence from di erent sources cumulatively and with weights, without incurring too much computational overhead (such as in probabilistic reasoning or Dempster-Shafer calculus; cf. Pearl 7] and Shafer 10] ).
3. Because of the lack of gradedness, the theory will make projections too far along a chain of reasoning (or too far into the future; Sun 15] This is certainly not true. The problem is that, along a chain of inference (as well as in temporal projections), the con dence for the conclusions reached should weaken. We can weaken con dence along the way only when gradedness is reinstated into causal models.
4. The clear-cut necessity and possibility is a problem, because in reality there is clear-cut difference between causes and enabling conditions, in the sense that . The di erence is more graded (as will be illustrated later). And often the two are interchangeable; for example, \He is shot dead" is expressed in CT as 2shoot(t; t)^3:wearing-bullet-proof-vest(t,t):::::: ?! 2dead(t + 1; t + 1) and \His failure to wear the bullet-proof vest caused his tragic death" is expressed as 2:wearing-bullet-proof-vest(t,t)^3shoot(t; t):::::: ?! 2dead(t + 1; t + 1)
So one fact can be both a cause and an enabling condition, exhibiting the quality of each to a di erent degree.
5. Although the model distinguishes two di erent types of conditions, it does not explain why some conditions are necessary, and some conditions need only to be possible.
6. According to the model, it is necessary to list all causes and all enabling conditions, in order to guarantee correct results. This could be hard to do, because the number of enabling conditions could be in nite.
7. The causal connection between events in the left-hand side of an implication and events in the right-hand side of the same implication may not be deterministic. It could be probabilistic, or otherwise uncertain (Suppes 19] ).
For reviews of other accounts of causality (e.g., Salmon 9 De nition 2 A Fact is an atom or its negation, represented by a letter (with or without a negation symbol) and having a value between l and u (e.g. l=-1 and u=1). The value of an atom is related to the value of its negation by a speci c method, so that knowing the value of an atom results in immediately knowing the value of its negation, or vice versa. 3 Unknown is generally represented by a value equal to l+u 2 . Now we can de ne rules and their related weighting schemes:
De nition 3 A Rule is a structure composed of two parts: a left-hand side (LHS), which consists of one or more facts, and a right-hand side (RHS), which consists of one fact. When facts in LHS get assigned values, the fact in RHS can be assigned a value according to a weighting scheme 4 . 3 We will adopt a generic con dence measure as the value of a fact. 4 When the value of a fact in LHS is unknown, assign as its value whatever represents unknown.
De nition 4 A Weighting Scheme is a way of assigning a weight to each fact in LHS of a rule, with the total weights (i.e., the sum of the absolute values of all the weights) less than or equal to 1, and of determining the value of the fact in RHS of a rule by thresholded (if thresholds are used) weighted-sum of the values of the facts in LHS (or inner-products of weight vectors and vectors of values of LHS facts). When the range of values is continuous, then the weighted-sum is passed on if its absolute value is greater than the threshold, or l (the lowest possible value) if otherwise.
When the range of values is binary (or bipolar), then the result will be one or the other depending on whether the weighted-sum (or the absolute value of it) is greater than the threshold or not. 5 De nition 5 A Conclusion in FEL is a value associated with a fact, calculated from rules and facts by doing the following:
(1) for each rule having that conclusion in its RHS, obtain conclusions of all facts in its LHS (if any fact is unobtainable, assume it to be whatever value represents unknown); and then calculate the value of the conclusion in question using the weighting scheme;
(2) take the MAX of all these values associated with that conclusion calculated from di erent rules or given in initial input.
De nition 6 A rule set is said to be Hierarchical, if the graph depicting the rule set is acyclic; the graph is constructed by drawing a unidirectional link from each fact (atom) in LHS of a rule to the fact (atom) in RHS of a rule.
Making a rule set hierarchical avoids circular reasoning. Now FEL can be de ned as follows:
De nition 7 A Fuzzy Evidential Logic (FEL) is a 6-tuple: < A; R; W; T; I; C >, where A is a set of facts (the values of which are initially assumed to be the value representing unknown), R is a set of rules, W is a weighting scheme for R, T is a set of thresholds each of which is for one rule, I is a set of elements of the form (f; v) (where f is a fact, and v is the value of f), and C is a procedure for deriving conclusions (i.e. computing values of facts in RHS of a rule in R, based on the initial condition I).
We want di erentiate FEL into two versions: FEL 1 As an illustration of its capability and correctness, we want to show that FEL can implement Horn Clause logic as a special case (we will only deal with the propositional version here, and extensions to rst order cases is dealt with in Sun 15] We are now ready to see how FEL can simulate Horn clause logic.
De nition 11 A Binary FEL is a reduced version of FEL (either FEL 1 or FEL 2 ), in which values associated with facts are binary (or bipolar), total weights of each rule sum to 1, and all thresholds are set to 1.
Here is the theorem for the equivalence (see Appendix for proofs):
Theorem 1 The binary FEL is sound and complete with respect to Horn clause logic.
We want to show that FEL can simulate Shoham's Causal Theory, to further explore the logical capability of FEL. (We will only consider a non-temporal version of CT; that is, we strip away all temporal notations and treat the same proposition in the original de nition with di erent temporal variables as di erent propositions and represent them with di erent letters).
We have to nd a mapping between truth values of formulas in Causal Theory and values of facts in FEL. We will use FEL 2 for illustrations (FEL 1 will also work). Since in CT and in FEL, there is no logical OR and there is only a (implicit) logical AND in the LHS of a rule, which can be taken care of by a weighting scheme as will be discussed later, we do not have to worry about these two connectives in the mapping now. Therefore, we can use a mapping as follows, which can be easily veri ed to be consistent with regard to logical equivalence (for example, 2a = :3: a, where a on the left side is an atom in CT and a on the right side is a corresponding fact in FEL; they represent di erent things and have totally di erent value ranges.
With the mapping in hand, we can proceed to nd a weighting scheme to enable FEL to simulate Causal Theory. The problem is that in FEL we have nodes only for atoms such as a, b, m, n, etc.
but not for 2a or 3b, etc. We have two ways of dealing with this:
1. extending and making more complex the weighting scheme, 2. adding nodes that can be used to represent atoms with modal operators.
We will adopt the rst approach here (the second approach will also work | the di erence is insigni cant). Other cases can be analyzed the same way.
To nd a full correspondence between FEL and Causal Theory, we also need a proof procedure that enables the derivation of all correct results. Here is a proof procedure for CT:
Given a Causal Theory CT, and a set of initial conditions (initial true propositions) I: |||||||||||||||{ | For all a 2 I, infer a, 2a, and 3a.
| Repeat:
for^i2n i a i^j 3n j b j ?! 2c where n i a i 's are inferred, and :n j b j 's are non-inferable, 6 infer c, 2c, and 3c. w`a i FEL: c`(a; 1), where where`denotes derivability, w is a set of initial conditions for Causal Theory CT, and c is the set of initial conditions for FEL mapped over from w in CT.
Accounting for Commonsense Causality
Now we are ready to show how FEL extends justi ably Shoham's Causal Theory and solves the problems identi ed earlier.
To extend the FEL version of Shoham's Causal Theory, we rst notice that the causes need not be known with absolute certainty; that is, we should allow a con dence measure associated with each necessary fact (i.e. the one with 2), because of the gradedness, uncertainty and fuzziness of our knowledge. By the same token, the conclusions need not be binary either, so that uncertain causes can generate uncertain e ects. Moreover, even facts (causes) of absolutely certainty may not guarantee the expected e ects (i.e. the idea of uncertain causality; Suppes 19] ). Therefore, we will associate a con dence measure with each of the causes (i.e. the facts in LHS of a rule) between -1 and 1, and a con dence measure also with the e ect (i.e. the fact in RHS of a rule). We can use weights to create a mapping between con dence measures of causes (i.e. values of the corresponding facts) and con dence measures of e ects (i.e. values of the corresponding facts), so from a set of causes and their con dence measures (i.e. a set of facts and their values) we can deduce a con dence measure for an e ect (or a value for a fact in RHS). Moreover, the set of weights associated with facts in LHS of a rule should re ect their relative importance: more important causes should have a larger weight associated with them, and since the total weights sum to 1, the value of a weight for a particular fact (condition) re ects its relative importance against a background of all other conditions.
Another issue to consider is how to handle possible condition facts (i.e. those with 3). As explained before, there is a special function associated with them, which elevates 0 to 1 or -1, according to whether positive or negative forms appear in the causal rule. Since we now extend the binary (or bipolar) space for truth values into a graded, continuous space, there is no more need for that elevation function. It follows from the fact that when a possible condition fact is unknown (i.e. its value is 0), the conclusion can still be reached, albeit with a smaller value (in con dence level). Now that we no longer require a binary (or bipolar) outcome, it is ne to have a smaller value for a conclusion when some enabling conditions are unknown. When one of these enabling conditions become known, the value will become higher; that is, we will have more con dence in the conclusion. Normally the weights associated with those enabling conditions will be relatively small anyway, because they are non-essential and close to \don't care" conditions. So it is advantageous to remove the elevation functions in the FEL version of Shoham's Causal Theory and assign weights instead. An alternative perspective of viewing the extension is that of \fuzzifying" the necessity function and the possibility function. Instead of having a necessity function as depicted in Figure 1 , we can have a fuzzi ed necessity function as in Figure 2 , for the purpose of accounting for the inexact nature of real world situations and knowledge. Similarly, instead of having a possibility function as depicted in Figure 3 , we can have a fuzzi ed possibility function as in Figure 4 . Once fuzzi ed, these new functions wind up to be identity functions. (Other ways of fuzzifying them are also possible; we adopt this particular way for its simplicity. If a certain domain requires more complex ways of fuzzifying these functions, this approach can be extended in a straightforward way.) Therefore, combining the above two perspectives, causes are those conditions that have high weights, and enabling conditions are those conditions that have low weights.
We can now easily map the FEL terminology into the causal terminology as follows:
Events are facts in FEL. Causal Statements are rules in FEL. Causes are those conditions of a rule that have high weights associated with them according to some particular weighting scheme.
Enabling Conditions are those conditions of a rule that have low weights associated with them according to some particular weighting scheme.
E ects are facts in the RHS of a rule.
Let us go back to the issues we raised before:
The gradedness is readily taken care of in FEL by the values associated with each fact.
Because of the introduction of the gradedness and uncertain rules (i.e. rules with total weights less than 1), the values of the conclusions (i.e. the con dence we have in the conclusions) will weaken along the way in a chaining. For example, here is a FEL rule stating that if one is alive at time t, one will be alive at time t + 1:
Suppose the weight is equal to 0.99, then if given alive(0)=1, we will have alive(1)=0.99, alive(2)=0.98, alive(3)=0.97, and so on.
There is no more need to tell exactly which condition is necessary and which condition is possible: the di erence is graded, and the importance of a condition depends on the relative magnitude of its weight. Weights are, in turn, determined based on the relative frequencies, propensities, and other characteristics of events involved. In real world situations, they should re ect the past experiences of interacting with the world.
There is no more need to list all conditions (the total number of which might be in nite), as long as we leave room in the weight distribution (keeping total weights less than 1). We can list only those conditions that we care about, and by doing so, the sum of weights will then be less than 1, accommodating possible roles of other unlisted conditions in determining the causal outcome.
The indeterminate or probabilistic nature of causality is readily captured in the weighting scheme: the weights do not have to sum to 1, and not all conditions have to be known for certain in order to deduce a plausible conclusion.
Let us look back to the shooting example. Instead of having two separate causal statements in CT as before, 2shoot(t; t)^3:wearing-bullet-proof-vest(t,t):::::: ?! 2dead(t + 1; t + 1) and 2:wearing-bullet-proof-vest(t,t)^3shoot(t; t):::::: ?! 2dead(t + 1; t + 1)
we will have in FEL one single causal statement for all the situations:
:wearing-bullet-proof-vest^shoot:::::: ?! dead (w 1 ; w 2 ; :::::) and weights are assigned to each fact in the LHS 15] . We assume the values of the unknown facts to be zero and calculate the value of the conclusion by inner-products of the weights and the values of the facts in the LHS of the rule.
We can compare FEL with the particular version of fuzzy logic in Zadeh 21] : instead of using MIN/MAX, FEL uses multiplications and additions, so that weighting of evidence (by multiplication with a preset weight) and accumulation of evidence (by adding up the weighted input activations) can take place. While most fuzzy logic formalisms choose 0, 1] as their value range (as in FEL 1 ), we use -1, 1] as the value range (in FEL 2 ), which has clearer semantics. It should be noted that many di erent types of operators have been used in di erent fuzzy logic theories, including weighted-sums, especially in multi-criteria decision making 22]. There seems to be a convergence of approaches in neural networks, fuzzy logics, and causal reasoning. Another case in point is Kosko 6] , who looked into using neural networks for modeling causal relations, although no theoretical work has been done in establishing the logical capabilities of such models.
The Neural Network Connection
To see how the above model can be equated with a neural network, we will de ne formally implementations of FEL:
De nition 12 An Implementation of FEL is a network of elements connected via links, where each element represents an atom and its negation (there is a one-to-one mapping between an atom, including its negation, and an element ) and links represent rules, going from elements representing facts in LHS of a rule to elements representing facts in RHS of a rule.
We de ne the notion of an element formally:
De nition 13 An Element is a structure that represents one and only one fact and has multiple sites each of which receives a group of links that represents one single rule (i.e. links from facts in the LHS of the same rule).
This implementation of FEL is in fact a neural network: elements are nodes in a network, rules are, as de ned above, links between these nodes emanating from nodes representing conditions in a rule to nodes representing conclusions in a rule, and the weighted-sum computation is carried out within each site of a node for computing and propagating activations (in FEL terms, for evidential combination in reaching conclusions based on given conditions). Activations from di erent sites of a node are MAXed, corresponding to the previous de nition of conclusions. (This idea of multiple sites in a node is commonly used in literature; see 20] for details.)
This static mapping from FEL to neural networks is rather straightforward, since FEL is modeled after neural networks with weighted-sum activation functions to begin with. In terms of dynamics, FEL can also be easily mapped to neural networks. In FEL, we did not specify any particular order in which inferences should be performed; thus in implementations, we are free to choose whatever order is appropriate. The neural network implementation of FEL can be viewed as performing a parallel breadth-rst search in inferencing 18]. Details of such implementations are beyond the scope of this paper; for formal proofs of correctness and other details, see Sun 18 ]. An example network is shown in Figure 5 .
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, Shoham's modal logic formalism for causal reasoning is critically analyzed; knowing its weakness in expressing graded concepts and other problems resulting from this, we proceed to de ne a di erent formalism, FEL, that utilizes weighted-sum computation and corresponds directly to neural network models. We prove that FEL can implement Shoham's logic as a special case as well as Horn clause logic, and furthermore that FEL (or a weighted-sum neural network) is a justi ed extension of Shoham's logic. This work also establishes the logical equivalence of neural network models, adding to our understanding of the relationship between rule-based reasoning and reasoning in neural networks. This work serves to justify a particular neural network architecture proposed by the author, the CONSYDERR The inference rule for FEL can be de ned as a variant of forward chaining rule, as follows: Let K be a set of FEL propositions, i.e. pairs (f,v), where f is a proposition and v is a real number between 0 and 1 (or between -1 and 1) representing the con dence that f is true. We assume that all propositions are uniquely represented in K (though their con dence values may be zero). The inference rule will simply add FEL propositions to K until no new propositions can be added: Suppose that we are given a Horn clause theory H. Let F be a FEL theory corresponding to T (as above), and assume that all propositions in K initially have certainty values 0, then (f,1) is a FEL logical consequence of F i f is a logical consequence of H.
To see this, observe that a FEL proposition (f,1) is added to K if and only if all of the propositions in the body of the clause have certainty values 1. Thus, (f,1) is only introduced to K if there exists propositions (p 1 ,1) ,....,(p r ,1) in K. It follows that the FEL inference rule behaves exactly like the forward chaining operator for Horn clause logic when we restrict our attention to propositions of value 1. Forward chaining is a sound and complete inference rule for Horn clause theories. f is a logical consequence of H, i f can be inferred by forward chaining in H, i (f,1) can be inferred by FEL inference.
Therefore, because of the fact that Horn clause forward-chaining inference rules is sound and complete, it is clear that Binary FEL is sound and complete with respect to Horn Clause Logic.
Q.E.D Theorem The proof procedure for FEL carries out exactly the proof procedure for Causal Theory when Causal Theory is implemented in FEL in the aforementioned way (the two system are sound and complete for each other).
Proof
Let us look at each step of the procedure.
Step 1: For implementing CT, the initial conditions are given with value 1. So inferring a=1 in FEL is equivalent to inferring a, 2a and 3a in CT.
Step 2: Inferability is dealt with in the same way in FEL and CT. When a rule is chosen in FEL, we infer the conclusion c=v c according to the particular weighting scheme which maps FEL to CT. With this particular weighting scheme for implementing CT, v c has to be 1, which means we can infer in CT: c, 2c and 3c.
Q.E.D gure
